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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAMONT F. TORONTO, l 
Plaintiff -RespondPnt. 
vs. 
GEORGE D. CLYDE, A. PRATT 
KESLER, CLAIR R. HOPKINS and 
the STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 
10069 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was instituted by plaintiff to determine 
the constitutionality of Chapter 148, Laws of Utah 1963 
(codified as Chapter 2, Title 63, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953, as amended)), and further to determine the legal-
ity of the payment to defendant Clair R. Hopkins of his 
salary for the period July 1 through July 15, 1963. The 
legislation in question is commonly known as the Finance 
Act which was enacted into law in 1963 by the 35th Leg-
islature as Senate Bill No. 48. The basic contention of 
plaintiff is that the Act in question invades constitutional 
duties of the Board of Examiners and is therefore invalid. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The effect of the judgment entered by the lower court 
actually results in the following conclusions: 
1. Section 63-2-13 and Section 63-2-15 are unconsti-
tutional insofar as the following language restricts the 
constitutional duty of the Board of Examiners to set or re-
set salary figures for state employees, or to establish rules 
for travel expenses: 
The board of examiners in conducting any examina-
tion of claims shall not have authority to fix, reset 
or arbitrarily refuse to pay salaries set by the di-
rector of finance or officers' salaries as determined 
by agency governing boards. (Section 63-2-13.) 
The director of finance shall establish mileage and 
travel expense schedules and set up rules and regu-
lations for travel of all state officers, employees 
and part-time officials; and such schedules shall 
have the force of law in all departments and no 
voucher for travel expense shall be paid until the 
same has been approved by the director. No obliga-
tion shall be incurred for travel outside of the state 
without the advance approval of the governor 
through the director of finance. Such approval shall 
consist of a certification as to the availability of 
funds as well as a review of the necessity and de-
sirability of such travel. This provision shall not 
apply to the Legislature, legislative committees or 
members and employees of the legislative council. 
(Section 63-2-15.) 
2. Section 63-2-20 is unconstitutional insofar as the 
following language restricts the constitutional duty of the 
Board of Examiners to examine claims against the State: 
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Any examination of claims as may be conducted by 
the board of examiners shall be made prior to pay-
ment but only after the obligation has been incurred 
and an account has been submitted and audited by 
the state's accounting officer. 
3. Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution of Utah 
imposes upon the Board of Examiners a constitutional duty 
to examine all claims against the State, including salary 
claims to be paid from appropriated funds, and since the 
Board did not approve the salary claim of Clair R. Hopkins 
for the pay period July 1 through July 15, 1963, in either 
a regular or special meeting, such salary payment was un-
lawful. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants (appellants) seek the following relief on 
appeal: 
1. As to Section 63-2-13, defendants seek a determ-
ination that Article VII, Section 13, Constitution of Utah, 
does not give the Board of Examiners the power to set 
salaries, re-set salaries, or arbitrarily refuse to permit pay-
ment of salaries, and that, therefore, the legislation is valid. 
2. As to Section 63-2-15, defendants seek a determi-
nation that the authority of the Department of Finance to 
review and approve or disapprove requests for travel, and 
to establish travel reimbursement schedules and limits, does 
not in any way conflict with the constitutional authority 
of the Board of Examiners. 
3. As to Section 63-2-20, defendants seek a determ-
ination that the word "claims" as used in Article VII, Sec-
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tion 13, Constitution of Utah, means only a "claim of right" 
when the demand is against appropriated funds, and that, 
therefore, the legislation is valid because it does not re-
strict any constitutional authority of the Board to examine 
claims. 
4. As to the semi-monthly salary payment to Clair 
R. Hopkins, defendants seek a determination that Article 
VII, Section 13, Constitution of Utah, gives to the Board 
of Examiners the power to examine claims, but does not 
impose upon the Board a duty to examine those claims 
which the Board believes do not justify examination, and 
that, since the Board in its discretion elected not to examine 
the semi-monthly salary claim of Clair R. Hopkins (but 
could have done if it had so desired), the payment thereof 
was lawful. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The issues in dispute are purely questions of law. The 
facts were in no way in dispute and were stipulated by 
counsel and filed with the court as follows : 
A. Plaintiff, Lamont F. Toronto, is the duly elected 
and qualified Secretary of State of the State of Utah and 
a citizen and taxpayer of the State of Utah. Defendant, 
George D. Clyde, is the duly elected and qualified Governor 
of the State of Utah; defendant, A. Pratt Kesler, is the 
duly elected and qualified Attorney General of the State 
of Utah; and defendant, Clair R. Hopkins, is the duly ap-
pointed and qualified Director of Finance of the State of 
Utah. 
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B. George D. Clyde, as Governor, A. Pratt Kesler, 
as Attorney General, and Lamont F. Toronto, as Secretary 
of State, are members of the Board of Examiners of the 
State of Utah. 
C. In accordance with Senate Bill 48 of the Thirty-
Fifth Legislature, amending various provisions of Chapter 
2 of Title 63, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and known as 
Chapter 148, Laws of Utah 1963, Clair R. Hopkins was 
appointed Director of Finance by Governor George D. 
Clyde at a salary of $14,520.00 payable semi-monthly, 
which salary was fixed and determined by the defendant, 
George D. Clyde. Such appointment was made July 1, 1963, 
which was the effective date of Senate Bill 48. 
D. On or about July 15, 1963, the defendant, Clair 
R. Hopkins, as Director of Finance and under the authority 
of Senate Bill No. 48 and in particular that part of Sec-
tion 1 thereof amending Sections 63-2-13 and 63-2-20, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, caused the payroll for State employ-
ees to be prepared for the pay period July 1 1963 through 
July 15, 1963, including the semi-monthly installment of 
the annual salary claimed by him as Director of Finance. 
E. The semi-monthly installment of the salary 
claimed by the defendant, Clair R. Hopkins, was thereafter 
paid on a warrant drawn by the Department of Finance 
upon the State Treasurer. Prior to the payment thereof, 
a summary sheet having attached thereto the payroll for 
all State employees for the pay period in question (includ-
ing the salary claim of Clair R. Hopkins), was presented 
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to the plaintiff, Lamont F. Toronto, for his signature of 
approval, and he refused to sign his approval; and said 
summary sheet with the attached payroll was also pre-
sented to defendant, A. Pratt Kesler, who did sign his ap-
proval. At the time the summary sheet and attached pay-
roll were presented to Lamont F. Toronto and A. Pratt 
Kesler, Governor George D. Clyde had departed for the 
State of Florida to attend a Governor's convention and was 
not available to sign said summary sheet. Upon his return 
to the State of Utah, but after the warrants in payment 
of the payroll had issued, Governor Clyde signed his ap-
proval to the summary sheet with the attached payroll. A 
procedure which has been adopted and followed by the 
Board of Examiners to cover certain situations where 
members of the Board are unavailable is attached hereto 
as Exhibit A. The Board of Examiners did not consider 
or act upon, in any regular or special meeting, the war-
rants to be drawn to pay the salary claims of individuals 
for the period in question. The payroll with the attached 
summary sheet was simply circulated to the individual 
members of the Board of Examiners in their respective 
offices, consistent with past practice. 
F. At the time request for payment of said salary 
claim was made and at the time of payment thereof funds 
sufficient to pay the same were available from the current 
budgetary allocations to the Department of Finance of the 
funds appropriated by the Thirty-Fifth Legislature of the 
State of Utah. 
G. Since the effective date of Senate Bill No. 48 the 
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Board of Examiners has not delegated to the Department 
of Finance any of its authority to examine, approve or dis-
approve claims against the State of Utah. In 1941 (See 
Exhibit B), 1942 (See Exhibit C) and in 1943 (See Ex-
hibit D) , the Board of Examiners purported to delegate 
certain of its authority with respect to the examination 
of claims against the State to the Commission of Finance, 
the predecessor of the Department of Finance, and since 
that time and until the effective date of Senate Bill No. 
48, all expenditures and public funds of the State of Utah 
have been made in accordance with the procedures out-
lined in Exhibits B, C, and D. 
H. The procedure with respect to the expenditures 
of public funds may be outlined as follows: 
(1) Prior to the convening of each legislature the 
various departments and agencies of the State submit bud-
get requests to the Governor who, with the assistance of 
the Department of Finance, formulates a proposed budget 
for the ensuing biennium. 
(2) Using the budget as a guide but without ·being 
bound thereby, the Legislature determines the amount of 
funds to be appropriated to the various departments and 
agencies of the State. 
(3) Following the enactment of the appropriations 
bill or bills by the Legislature, the Governor, with the 
assistance of the Department of Finance, allocates the bi-
ennial appropriations to the particular departments on a 
yearly and quarterly basis. 
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(4) When a department or agency of the State re-
quests a disbursement of public funds for a particular pur-
pose the request and the amount thereof are submitted to 
the Department of Finance : 
(a) The Department of Finance determines 
whether the proposed expenditure is mathematically 
accurate and supported by proper vouchers or other 
evidence of the amount of the expenditure. 
(b) The Department of Finance determines 
whether the proposed expenditure exceeds the budge-
tary allocations to the Department under the particu-
lar classification of expenditure allocated in the bud-
get. 
(c) Prior to July 1, 1963, if the proposed ex-
penditure was within the appropriated funds of the 
Department and the budgetary allocations to the De-
partment, the request was certified as to availability 
of funds and passed on to the Board of Examiners, 
who approved or disapproved the same. 
(d) Since July 1, 1963, the Department of Fi-
nance has not only certified proposed expenditures as 
to availability of funds, but has further approved or 
rejected such proposed expenditures as to their pro-
priety. The Department of Finance contends that from 
and after July 1, 1963, it has no duty or obligation to 
present the questions of salary figures or salary raises 
to the Board of Examiners for its approval. The De-
partment has, however, consistent with past practice, 
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presented to the Board for its approval summary 
sheets having attached thereto the payroll for all state 
employees for a particular pay period, but the Board 
has not met to separately consider and approve salary 
increases, new salaries and similar matters. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
SECTION 63-2-13 IS VALID LEGISLATION. 
A. The Legislature intended to take away cer-
tain statutory duties and powers of the Board 
of Examiners. 
It is helpful initially to put in proper perspective what 
the Legislature intended to do in its enactment of Chapter 
148, Laws of Utah 1963. There were in fact a group of 
companion bills introduced and passed with Senate Bill No. 
48, which generally took from the Board of Examiners the 
previous statutory duty to examine transactions involving 
sales and exchanges of land and various other matters (in-
cluding payment of claims from appropriated funds), and 
which purported to consolidate these general administra-
tive duties relating to the State's finances and property 
within the Department of Finance under the supervision 
of the office of the Governor. Senate Bill No. 48 as codi-
fied recites in Section 63-2-1 that: 
"There is created a department to be known 
as the department of finance attached to the office 
of the governor to assist the governor in the execu-
tion of his constitutional duties as the state's chief 
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executive officer and which shall perform such du-
ties and functions as may be prescribed by law. 
In construing the authorities and duties imposed by 
this act, it is the intent of the legislature to define 
budgetary functions relating to the approval and 
allocation of funds, budgetary control of funds, 
prescribing personnel qualifications and salary 
schedules, approval of proposed expenditures for 
the purchase of supplies and services; and prescrib-
ing other budgetary functions under the constitu-
tional authority of the state's chief executive to 
transact all executive business for the state, as dif-
ferentiated from the examination of claims as may 
be exercised by the board of examiners." (Emphasis 
added. 
It is therefore important to note that Senate Bill No. 
48 is essentially for the purpose of consolidating and imple-
menting the administrative processes for budgeting, allot-
ting, and spending public funds under the general super-
vision and control of the State's chief executive. Any ex-
amination of claims by the Board of Examiners is com-
pletely independent from the administrative processes out-
lined by the act. 
It is not denied that the Legislature intended to re-
move the Board of Examiners from the admnistrative 
functioning of the Department of Finance. It is clear that 
the Legislature. intended such administrative supervision 
to be directly under the Governor. Perhaps this legislation 
was prompted in part because the Board of Examiners had 
previously exercised certain supervision over the adminis-
trative procedures of the Department of Finance and per-
haps because the Utah Supreme Court had earlier charac-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
terized the Commission of Finance as the ''administrative 
arm" of the Board of Examiners. See for example, Bate-
man V. Board of Examiners, 7 Utah 2d 221, 322 P. 2d 381 
(1958). 
B. Aticle VII, Section 13, Constitution of Utah, 
does not give the Board of Examiners the 
authority to set or re-set salary figures, or 
to arbitrarily refuse to permit payment of 
salaries. 
The lower court found part of Section 63-2-13 to be 
unconstitutional as an invasion of the constitutional author-
ity of the Board of Examiners. Section 63-2-13 provides 
as follows: 
"The director of finance shall prescribe and 
fix a schedule of salaries for the officers, clerks, 
stenographers and employees of all state offices, 
departments, boards and commissions, except where 
such salaries are fixed by statute, by appropriation 
or where agency governing boards are authorized 
by statute to fix the salary of certain officers. The 
director of finance must in all cases give certifica-
tion as to the availability of funds to pay salaries. 
The board of examiners in conducting any examin-
ation of claims shall not have authority to fix, reset 
or arbitrarily refuse to pay salaries set by the di-
rector of finance or officers' salaries as determined 
by agency governing boards. Such schedule of sal-
aries shall have the force of law in all state offices, 
departments, boards and commissions, and shall in 
no case be exceeded without the express approval 
of the director of finance. No salary schedule shall 
be put into effect until approved by the governor." 
(Emphasis added.) 
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This section was stricken by the lower court to the 
extent that the part in italics states that the Board of Ex-
aminers shall not fix, reset or arbitrarily refuse to pay 
salaries. 
Article VII, Section 13, Constitution of Utah, provides 
that: 
Until otherwise provided by law, the Governor, 
Secretary of State and Attorney-General shall con-
stitute a Board of State Prison Commissioners, 
which Board shall have such supervision of all mat-
ters connected with the State Prison as may be 
provided by law. They shall, also, constitute a 
Board of Examiners, with power to examine all 
claims against the State except salaries or compen-
sation of officers fixed by law, and perform such 
other duties as may be prescribed by law; and no 
claim against the State, except for salaries and 
compensation of officers fixed by law, shall be 
passed upon by the Legislature without having been 
considered and acted upon by the said Board of Ex-
aminers. 
It is difficult to see why the statute offends any con-
stitutional authority of the Board of Examiners. There is 
no suggestion, not even the slightest hint, in Article VII, 
Section 13, that the Board of Examiners may set or fix, 
or reset or refix, salaries. It is true that the Board of Ex-
aminers could refuse to permit a salary claim if for some 
justifiable reason the claim was not a proper one. But, 
the discretion of the Board would be limited to an exam-
ination of the validity of the salary daim and under no 
theory could extend to permit establishment of salary rates 
to be paid, unless legislation empowered the Board to do 
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so. The above section, however, has specifically provided 
that the Board of Examiners shall not set salaries. 
Since a legislative prohibition against the Board of 
Examiners either setting or resetting salaries in no way 
conflicts with its constitutional authority, the only remain-
ing question as to the validity of Section 63-2-13 would be 
the language which says the Board cannot "arbitrarily re-
fuse to pay salaries.'' This provision can only be unconsti-
tutional if the Board of Examiners has a right arbitrarily 
to refuse to pay salaries. There can be no question in this 
regard, because this Court has specifically held that the 
Board of Examiners cannot act arbitrarily. In State v. 
Cutler, 34 Utah 99, 95 Pac. 1071 (1908), this court said 
that the Board of Examiners had discretion in allowing 
or rejecting claims, "But this discretion is not one that 
may be arbitrarily exercised * * *." Further, in 
Bateman v. Board of Exa·miners, 7 U. 2d 221, 322 P. 2d 
381 (1958), this court said: 
"We do not desire to be understood as saying 
that Examiners can go so far as to in effect exer-
cise a veto power over legislation by arbitrarily re-
fusing to make funds available which have been 
appropriated to Education for either general or 
specific purposes. Insofar as this has been done in 
certain instances which had considerable bearing 
upon precipitating this litigation, such actions were 
wrong." (Emphasis added.) 
Since the Board of Examiners can make no claim to 
any constitutional authority to establish or to reset salaries, 
and since this Court has specifically stated the rather ob-
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vious rule of law that this Board cannot act arbitrarily, it 
is impossible to see any reason why Section 63-2-13 can 
conflict with any constitutional power or authority of the 
Board of Examiners. If the section referred to provided 
that the Board of Examiners "could not refuse or deny 
payment of salary claims," then it is admitted that the 
section would certainly be unconstitutional, but the statute 
neither says nor suggests any such thing. 
POINT II. 
SECTION 63-2-15 IS VALID LEGISLATION. 
It is not clear why either plaintiff or the lower court 
thought Section 63-2-15 was unconstitutional. No mention 
was made of that section in any of the pleadings. No ref-
erence was made to it in the lower court's memorandum 
decision (R. 30-34). The first time Section 63-2-15 ap-
peared in this lawsuit was when the final Judgment and 
Decree was prepared by plaintiff's counsel and signed by 
the judge, wherein paragraph 2 simply recites that Senate 
Bill 48 is unconstitutional insofar as it "authorizes the Di-
rector of Finance of the State of Utah to process and pay 
claims against the State of Utah * * * without the 
examination and approval of the Board of Examiners 
* * *" (R. 36). 
The judgment then declares that "the following provi-
sions of Senate Bill 48" are unconstitutional, and, without 
further comment, sets forth Sections 63-2-13, 63-2-15 and 
63-2-20 (R. 36-37). Section 63-2-15 simply provides that: 
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The director of finance shall establish mileage and 
travel expense schedules and set up rules and regu-
lations for travel of all state officers, employees and 
part-time officials; and such schedules shall have 
the force of law in all departments and no vouncher 
for travel expense shall be paid until the same has 
been approved by the director. No obligation shall 
be incurred for travel outside of the state without 
the advance approval of the governor through the 
director of finance. Such approval shall consist of 
a certification as to the availability of funds as 
well as a review of the necessity and desirability of 
such travel. This provision shall not apply to the 
Legislature, legislative committees or members and 
employees of the legislative council. (Section 63-
2-15.) 
Since the above statute in no way provides for pay-
ment of claims without the approval of the Board of Exam-
iners (and, in fact, does not even refer to the Board), it 
is difficult to see why the constitutional authority of the 
Board could be impaired by this legislation. If the lower 
court thought the Board of Examiners had constitutional 
authority to set travel expense rules and regulations and to 
establish mileage reimbursement figures, then we consider 
the argument under Point I above to be a complete answer 
to such a contention. If the lower court thought the legis-
lation was unconstitutional because it prevents the creation 
of an out-of-state travel expense "obligation" without prior 
approval of the Director of Finance, then we consider the 
argument under Point III, infra, to be a complete answer 
to such contention. 
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POINT III. 
SECTION 63-2-20 IS VALID LEGISLATION. 
A. The Legislature has merely defined "claims" 
to mean obligations of the State when such 
claims are processed administratively by the 
Department of Finance, and this definition 
does not offend the reasonable meaning of 
that word as used in Article VII, Section 13, 
Constitution of Utah. 
The lower court also found unconstitutional certain 
parts of Section 63-2-20, which provides : 
"The director of finance shall exercise budge-
tary control over all state departments, institutions 
and agencies. The director shall require the head of 
each department to submit to him not later than 
May 15th of each year, a work program for the 
ensuing fiscal year and may at any time require any 
department to submit a work program for any other 
period. Such program shall include appropriations 
and all other funds from any source whatsoever 
made available to said department for its operation 
and maintenance and shall show the requested allot-
ments of said appropriations and other funds by 
quarterly periods for the ensuing or current fiscal 
year by function, division, program or activity 
authorized. The director of finance shall review 
the work program of each department and shall, if 
the governor deems necessary, revise, alter, de-
crease or change such allotments before or after 
approving the same; or, may proceed to make in-
dependent allotments which shall be binding on the 
said department when a work program is not fur-
nished by any said department as required by this 
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section. The aggregate of such allotments shall not 
exceed the total appropriations or other funds from 
any source whatsoever made available to said de-
partment for the fiscal year in question. The di-
rector of finance shall transmit a copy of the allot-
ments when approved by the governor to the head 
of the department concerned and also a copy to the 
auditor of the state. The director of finance shall 
thereupon permit all expenditures to be made from 
the appropriations or other funds from any source 
whatsoever on the basis of such allotments and not 
otherwise, unless such allotments or any part there-
of are subsequently revised or changed by the di-
rector of finance. The director shall examine and 
approve or disapprove all requisitions and requests 
for proposed expenditures of the several depart-
ments, except salaries or compensation of officers 
fixed by law in which case the director shall certify 
only the availability of funds, and no requisitions 
of any of the departments shall be allowed nor shall 
any obligation be created without the approval and 
the certification of the director. The director shall 
employ such budget examiners as may be necessary 
to approve allotments and examine the propriety 
of all proposed expenditures and facilitate program 
planning and management improvement of state 
operations. It is the intent of the legislature that 
the department of finance shall examine and pass 
upon all proposed expenditures. Any examination 
of claims as may be conducted by the board of ex-
aminers shall be made prior to payment but only 
after the obligation has been incurred and an ac-
count has been submitted and audited by the state's 
accounting officer.'' (Emphasis added.) 
The language found by the court to be objectionable 
was the last sentence which is set forth above in italics. 
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That sentence simply provides that any examination, which 
the Board of Examiners in its discretion decides to con-
duct, shall be prior to payment of the claim but after there 
has been a pre-audit and an account established so that 
there is an obligation created or some right or claim of 
right established in favor of the claimant. This amounts 
to nothing more than an attempt by the Legislature to 
define the word "claims" with reference to State fiscal 
procedures. The Board of Examiners in no way is pre-
vented from conducting an examination with regard to any 
claims which it may wish to examine, but is simply re-
stricted from an examination of something which is not 
yet a claim and is requested to make any such examination 
before the claim ceases to become a claim. In other words, 
no claim comes into existence until the claimant can assert 
a bona fide claim of right, and that cannot occur prior to 
some commitment on the part of the State which would 
create an obligation or an apparent obligation on the part 
of the State. All that the Legislature has done in the 
language above quoted is to say that applications, bids, 
etc., in the process of preliminary administrative handling 
are not claims until some person is hired, some contract 
awarded, or until something happens which would pur-
portedly create an obligation. 
The other apparent requirement of the legislation un-
der discussion is that the Board conduct any examination 
it wishes to conduct prior to payment of a claim. The Leg-
islature has thus said, in effect, that after a claim is paid 
it no longer is a claim because the obligation is discharged. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
It is submitted that this unquestionably is a correct state-
ment of the law. While this Court, rather than the Legisla-
ture, is the proper entity to construe the meaning of words 
and phrases appearing in the Utah Constitution, there is 
nothing improper with legislation which properly explains 
and defines words in the Constitution for the purpose of 
implementing sound fiscal procedures. While it is perfectly 
proper for this Court to strike any legislation which im-
properly construes constitutional provisions, this Court 
should not strike legislation which correctly construes por-
tions of the Constitution. Since Section 63-2-20, quoted 
above, in effect defines the word "claim" in a manner com-
pletely consistent with established law, there is nothing 
offensive about the language used in that statute. 
B. The word "claim" is clear and unambiguous, 
and means a demand pursuant to an asserted 
right. 
As already mentioned, the language used in Section 
63-2-20 can be offensive only if it is an inaccurate defini-
tion of the word "claims" as used and intended by the 
framers of the Constitution. All that the Legislature has 
done is to establish a time at which a claim comes into ex-
istence and a time at which a claim goes out of existence, 
and provides that the Board of Examiners, if it wishes to 
examine claims, should examine claims, while they are 
claims. State fiscal procedures and processes involve a good 
many applications, requests, bids, and other preliminary 
dealings between the State and prospective claimants which 
never ripen into claims. For example, if someone submits 
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an application for employment with the State of Utah but 
there is no position available, it can hardly be said that such 
applicant has a claim against the State; or, if a person sub-
mits a bid pursuant to a request for bids and it is found 
that such bid is the high bid and nowhere near competitive, 
then it can hardly be said that such bidder has a claim 
against the State. It is only when the preliminary processes 
have proceeded to a point where the claimant can assert 
some theory whereby he has a right against the State of 
Utah that a claim comes into existence. Similarly, after any 
claim of right has been paid by the State, then such claim· 
ant no longer has a claim because such claim has been 
fully satisfied and discharged. 
Since a claim must be considered to be a claim of 
right, it is submitted that the language of the statute under 
consideration is accurate in reciting that there is no claim 
prior to the existence of an obligation by the State nor 
after the payment and discharge of such obligation. There. 
fore, it is completely permissible to recite that the Board 
of Examiners conduct its examination after the obligation 
is created and before the obligation is paid. If the meaning 
of the word "claim'' is so construed, then the language of 
the statute as above quoted is not offensive and is not un-
constitutional. 
While several of the earlier Utah cases discussed the 
meaning of the word "claim" as used in Article VII, Sec-
tion 13, of the Constitution, the most recent and by far 
the most liberal definition of that word appears in Bate-
man v. Board of Examiners, cited supra, as follows: 
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"In the first place, we think that the word 
'claim' was used in its broadest connotation and 
we recognize that it is susceptible of a variety of 
meanings; ranging from a moral claim; or the 
seeking of legislative largesse; or asserting a privi-
lege; to asserting right to compensation for prop-
erty or materials furnished, or salary for services 
rendered, to the state." 
To the extent that the foregoing definition purports 
to define those claims which may be examined by the Board 
of Examiners prior to submission to the Legislature, it is 
submitted that the definition is a good one. This is so be-
cause any person who has any claim of any kind under any 
theory is free to present the same to the Board of Exam-
iners for its action, and further, to petition the Legislature 
by way of special legislation. But, the foregoing definition 
cannot have complete application to the claims which are 
paid from appropriated funds. Even this is clear from the 
fact that the above definition refers to legislative largesse, 
which certainly could not be granted by anyone except the 
Legislature itself. 
Further, it is important to note that the legislation in 
question in no way purports to restrict or prevent the 
Board of Examiners from examining any claim or asser-
tion whereby any person aggrieved believes that he has a 
claim against appropriated funds. The only effect of the 
language in Section 63-2-20 is that, with reference to those 
claims which are processed pursuant to the administrative 
procedures set forth in that section, the examination shall 
be made after the obligation is created and before pay-
ment is made. Nothing is said to suggest that the Board 
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of Examiners in any way is restricted from exammmg 
claims which have not been processed pursuant to the 
procedures of said section. 
The vital criterion applicable here as to the meaning 
of the word "claim" is whether or not the person asserting 
it does so as a claim of right. Anything short of this should 
not be considered to be a claim with respect to payments 
from appropriated funds. Illustrative of the numerous 
authorities which have digested the cases and uniformly 
recited the rule are the following: 
317: 
Winfield, Adjudged Words & Phrases, page 110: 
" [A claim] is, in a just j urdicial sense, a de-
mand of some matter as of right made by one per-
son upon another, to do or to forbear to do some 
act or thing as a matter of duty." 
Black's Law Dictionary (1891 Ed.), page 209: 
"A claim is a right or title, actual or supposed, 
to a debt, privilege, or other thing in the possession 
of another; not the possession, but the means by or 
through which the claimant obtains the possession 
or enjoyment." 
Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (2nd Ed.), Vol. 1, page 
"'Claime', is a challenge by any man of the 
propertie or ownership of a thing which hee hath 
not in possession, but is withholden from him 
wrongfully." 
Wharton's Law Lexicon (12th Ed.) , page 177 : 
"[A claim is] a challenge of interest of any-
thing which is in another's possession, or at least 
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out of a man's own possession, as claim by charter, 
descent, etc." 
Repalje and Lawrence's Law Dictionary, Vol. 1, page 
216: 
" [A claim is] a challenge by any man of the 
property or ownership of a thing, not at the time 
in his possession, but (as he contends) wrongfully 
withheld from him." 
Kinney's Law Dictionary and Glossary, page 157: 
"[A claim is] a challenge or demand of the 
property or ownership or of some interest in a 
thing which the person demanding has not in his 
possession, but which is withheld from him unlaw-
fully; a demand of some matter as of right made by 
one person upon another, to do or to forbear to do 
some act or thing as a matter of duty." 
Bouvier's Law Dictionary (Rawle's Revision), Vol. 1, 
page 332: 
" [A claim is] a challenge of the ownership of 
a thing which is wrongfully withheld from the pos-
session of the claimant · * * *. The assertion 
of a liability to the party making it to do some ser-
vice or pay a sum of money." 
Words and Phrases (Permanent Ed.) , Vol. 7, pages 
457-58: 
"In its ordinary sense, a 'claim' imparts the 
assertion, demand, or challenge, of somehting as 
a right, or it means the thing thus demanded or 
challenged. 
"* * * 
" 'Claim', in its primary meaning, is used to 
indicate the assertion of an existing right. In its 
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secondary meaning it may be used to indicate the 
right itself." 
Ballantine, Law Dictionary (2nd Ed.), page 220: 
" [A claim is] the assertion of a demand, or the 
challenge of something, as a matter or right; a 
demand of some matter, as of right, made by one 
person upon another to do or to forbear to do some 
act or thing, as a matter of duty." 
Anderson's Dictionary of Law, page 185: 
" [A claim is] the assertion, demand or chal-
lenge of something as a right, or the thing thus 
demanded or challenged." 
From the forgoing authorities, it is clear that no other 
meaning or connotation of the word "claim" could have 
been intended by the framers of the Constitution other 
than an assertion of something as a matter of right, at 
least with respect to those requests for payment from ap-
propriated funds. And further still, the language of 63.:. 
2-20, referring to the Board's examination of claims, re-
lates only to those claims processed in accordance with 
such section and in no way purports to restrict the Board 
in its examination of other claims. It is, therefore, sub-
mitted that Section 63-2-20 should be sustained. 
POINT IV. 
THE SALARY PAYMENT TO CLAIR R. HOP-
KINS WAS LAWFUL. 
A. To hold that the Board of Examiners has a 
constitutional duty rather than a constitu-
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tional power demeans rather than dignifies 
the Board. 
The real question of power versus duty has been 
clouded to the extent that it has caused considerable con-
fusion. It has been assumed and believed (in the press and 
elsewhere) that this litigation involves the question of 
broad powers within the Board of Examiners versus re-
stricted powers within the Board of Examiners. Nothing 
could be further from the truth. The position of the de-
fendants is that the Board of Examiners has a very broad 
power to examine any and all claims against the State of 
Utah, but that it is not absolutely necessary for the Board 
to examine all of such claims if in its discretion it decides 
that it is unwise, unnecessary or impractical to examine 
certain claims. In other words, defendants contend that 
the Board of Examiners as a responsible constitutional en-
tity is equipped with the necessary discretion and responsi-
bility to decide when and under what circumstances any 
certain claim or group of claims should be examined. If it 
decides to examine all claims, it may do so. If it decides 
that there are certain routine claims which do not justify 
an examination, it has the constitutional discretion to de-
cide not to examine such claims. But, this discretion as to 
whether to examine or not to examine lies solely within 
the Board itself, and not in any other agency or officer. 
It is submitted that this position is fundamentally sound, 
for to hold that the Board of Examiners must examine all 
claims whether it wants to or not, is to hold that the Board 
of Examiners has sufficient discretion to examine and ap-
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prove or reject claims, but does not have reliable discre-
tion to determine which claims should be examined. Such 
a result, to say the least, is both anomalous and paradoxical. 
Plaintiff contends and the lower court held that the 
Board of Examiners has a constitutional duty to examine 
every claim of every nature, regardless of how routine, in-
significant, or mechanical the claim might be. Plaintiff, 
therefore, concludes that the failure of the Board of Ex-
aminers to examine any claim, including any semi-monthly 
salary payment of any State employee, is a failure to per-
form a constitutional requisite and, therefore, causes any 
payment of such claim to be absolutely void. Plaintiff 
would thus say that, if the Board of Examiners failed to 
examine and approve the validity of a $5.00 purchase of 
supplies, the payment for such supplies would be unlawful 
and void. 
It must at once become obvious that plaintiff's posi-
tion would not dignify the Board nor increase its power, 
but would, rather, reduce the Board of Examiners to a 
rather menial and perfunctory body which would have to 
examine many thousands of claims each month even though 
the Board itself saw no reason to examine many of the 
claims and did not want to examine many of the claims. 
When one considers the thousands of warrants that are 
issued semi-monthly by the Department of Finance for 
the payment of salaries, and the thousands of other war-
rants that are drawn to pay travel expenses, contract ex-
penses, acquisition of supplies, etc., it is absurd to believe 
that the Board of Examiners could perform such a task 
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even if it devoted itself to a full time attempt to examine 
such claims. 
It must be assumed that the Governor, the Attorney 
General, and the Secretary of State each have full-time de-
mands upon them in their respective offices, aside from 
the requirements of service upon the Board of Examiners. 
To hold that these busy chief officials of the State of Utah 
must take the time to examine and act upon all claims, and 
thus, in effect, do what it takes literally dozens of employ-
ees in the Department of Finance to do, is to depart from 
reason, logic and practicality, and to impose a completely 
illogical, unreasonable, and impossible burden upon the 
Board of Examiners. 
It therefore is obvious that in order to sustain the 
greatest dignity, independence, and power in the Board of 
Examiners as a responsible constitutional entity, it is nec-
essary to conclude that the Board has both discretion and 
power to examine all claims it wishes to examine, but that 
it does not have the menial and mechanical duty of exam-
ining those claims which in its discretion do not justify 
nor deserve examination. 
Plaintiff's position and the lower court's holding in 
this lawsuit is in fact one which demeans rather than 
dignifies the Board of Examiners. 
B. The legislation under review is not affected 
by a determination of the question of consti-
tutional power versus constitutional duty. 
It is important to clarify the issue of a constitution-
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ality duty versus a constitutional power with respect to the 
legislation in question. Neither Section 63-2-13, Section 63-
2-15, nor Section 63-2-20 is affected by a determination of 
this question, since it must be recognized that if the Legis-
lature has a constitutional duty, it cannot be interfered with 
by the Legislature, and if the Board of Examiners has a 
constitutional power, it cannot be interfered with by the 
Legislature. Therefore, the legislation cannot in any way 
preclude the Board of Examiners from examining any or all 
claims against the State of Utah. If the legislation pur-
ports to do so, it must be unconstitutional, whether this 
Court finds that the Board has a constitutional duty or a 
constitutional power. The only affect of this court's de-
termination of the question of duty versus power is with 
regard to the validity of the salary payment of defendant 
Clair R. Hopkins. This is so because the Board of Examin-
ers as a board did not elect to examine or to approve the 
salary payment in question. If there was a constitutional 
power to examine or not to examine in the discretion of 
the Board, then the salary payment was lawful. If, on the 
other hand, there was a constitutional duty to examine this 
salary payment in question, then, since that duty was not 
exercised, the salary payment would be unlawful because of 
a failure to satisfy a mandatory condition precedent to 
payment. 
Therefore, it is emphasized that the resolution of the 
question of power versus duty does not affect the legisla-
tion. If the legislation restricts or prevents the Board of 
Examiners from examining claims, it must be unconstitu-
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tional whether it interferes with a power or a duty. The 
only importance of the determination of this question r~ 
lates solely to the salary claim of Clair R. Hopkins and not 
to the validity of the legislation. 
C. The Constitution specifically and clearly 
grants a power rather than imposes a duty. 
It is submitted that the Utah Supreme Court has never 
distinguished power versus duty when speaking about the 
Board of Examiners. When deciding other issues, the 
Court has on occasion used language by way of dicta which 
would suggest that the Board had a duty. But, as will be 
shown in a later discussion of those cases, little significance 
can be attached to such language because the court was 
not focusing upon the distinction between a power and a 
duty. 
Of critical significance is the language of Article VII, 
Section 13, of the Constitution of Utah, which provides: 
"* * * They shall, also, constitute a Board 
of Examiners, with power to examine all claims 
against the State except salaries or compensation 
of officers fixed by law, and perform such other 
duties as may be prescribed by law; and no claim 
against the State, except for salaries and compen-
sation of officers fixed by law, shall be passed 
upon by the Legislature without having been con-
sidered and acted upon by the said Board of Exam-
iners." (Emphasis added.) 
The above language is clear to the effect that the 
Board has power to examine all claims against the State 
except salaries or compensation of officers fixed by law. 
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As to those claims which must be acted upon by the Legis-
lature, the Board must as a constitutional prerequisite act 
upon such claims prior to their consideration by the Legis-
lature. It is significant to note that there is no similar 
prerequisite for the payment of claims which are not pre-
sented to the Legislature. 
In other words, claims such as tort claims for which 
the State is not liable because of its soverign immunity, 
and other claims for which no legal redress is available 
to the claimant except by petition to the Legislature, re-
quire examination by the Board of Examiners. But claims 
for which appropriations have been made and which can 
be paid through ordinary State fiscal procedures without 
submission to the Legislature do not require examination 
by the Board of Examiners as a constitutional prerequisite, 
although the Board has power to examine such claims if it 
wishes to do so. 
Two factors of importance appear from the language 
of the constitutional provision. First, the Constitution uses 
the clear, unambiguous, meaningful word "power", and 
neither uses nor suggests the word "duty" when referring 
to an examination of claims. The second factor is that the 
Constitution does establish a required examination by the 
Board of those claims which are submitted to the Legisla-
ture. The negative implication must be that claims notre-
quired to be submitted to the Legislature need not be ex-
amined unless the Board elects to examine them. There-
fore, the use of the word "power", coupled with the nega-
tive implication that no examination is mandatory for pay-
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ments of claims from appropriated funds, establishes with 
clarity that the Board has simply a power and not a duty. 
As earlier stated, no case decided by this Court has 
ever held that the Board of Examiners has a constitutional 
duty to examine claims which are to be paid from ap-
propriated funds. This is so because the specific question 
has never been presented to the Court. When discussing 
other issues, the Court has used language which might be 
considered dicta and which might suggest that the Board 
did have such a duty. But, it will appear from an exam-
ination of those cases that such language not only was not 
the holding of the Court, but was not even dicta, for the 
reason that the Court was not considering the specific 
question. In other words, true dictum is a clear statement 
by the Court on an issue which it was not necessary for 
the Court to decide. But, a statement by the Court which 
is not even in response to a consideration of a specific 
question can hardly be said to be dicta with respect to such 
a question. This will be illustrated in the cases of State 
V. Edwards, Uintdh State Bank v. Ajax, and Board of Ed-
ucation v. Commission of Finance, discussed in that order 
below. 
In State v. Edwards, 33 Utah 243, 93 Pac. 720 (1908), 
a certain statute provided for the employment of court 
stenographers and for the payment of certain travel ex-
penses by a procedure whereby the District Judge would 
certify the travel expense vouchers to the State Auditor, 
who in turn was required to draw a warrant in payment 
of such travel expense. The question was not whether the 
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Board of Examiners had a duty to examine such claims 
for expense reimbursement, but was whether the Legisla-
ture could provide for a procedure of payment which would 
bypass the Board of Examiners and thereafter prevent the 
Board of Examiners from conducting an examination even 
if it wished to. Despite this clear-cut issue, the Court was 
rather loose in the language which it employed, and such 
language might mistakenly be construed to suggest that 
the court thought an examination by the Board of Exam-
iners was a constitutional prerequisite to payment: 
"The attempt by the Legislature to require the 
Auditor to allow a claim which by the Constitution 
must first be approved by the board of examiners 
can avail nothing. The Auditor is bound by the 
constitutional provision. The Legislature is so 
bound, and so are we. The Legislature may make 
certain evidence conclusive with regard to a specific 
matter, but it may not interfere with powers con-
ferred or duties imposed by the Constitution. This, 
in effect, is what is attempted to be done in section 
2, c. 72, p. 112, aforesaid. To the extent that the 
provisions of that section are in conflict with the 
constitutional provision governing salaries and com-
pensation of officers fixed by law, the Constitution 
must prevail." (Emphasis added.) 
It must be borne in mind, in reading the foregoing 
quote, that the issue was whether the Legislature could 
exclude the Board of Examiners from examining travel 
reimbursement claims. The issue was not whether the 
Board of Examiners was required to examine such claims 
if in its discretion it considered such an examination un-
necessary. 
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The second case using confusing language is Uintah 
State Bank v. Ajax, 77 Utah 455, 297 Pac. 434 (1931), 
which involved a mandamus proceeding to compel the State 
Auditor to draw a warrant in payment of bounty claims 
for killing predatory animals (25 coyotes and 7 bobcats). 
The bank apparently had taken an assignment of the bounty 
claim as security for a loan and then found it necessary to 
seek payment of the bounty claim in satisfaction of the 
debt. In any event, the bank demanded payment from the 
State Auditor and the Auditor declined on the ground that 
the statute providing for bounty payments purported to 
bypass the Board of Examiners. The issue in this case 
was identical to the issue in the Edwards case, i.e., whether 
the Legislature could bypass the Board of Examiners so 
as to exclude the Board from any examination of bounty 
claims. The Court said that the Edwards decision was con-
trolling and proceeded to hold that the Legislature could 
not bypass the Board of Examiners : 
"* * * May the Legislature then, in the 
face of our constitutional provision, pass over the 
board of examiners and set up some local agency 
by which claims may be fixed and settled without 
any state officer having power to examine and ap-
prove or disapprove such claim? 
"* * * The Constitution has vested in the 
Board of Examiners the power to examine and pass 
on all claims except those exempted, and the Leg-
islature is without authority to delegate such power 
to any other board or officer. 
"* * * If the view is taken that the Legis-
lature intended to make this claim payable by the 
auditor without presentation to the board of exam-
iners, then the Legislature attempted to do that 
which it had no power or authority to effectuate 
* * *" 
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It will be observed that the language used by the Court 
in the Uintah State Bank case suggests in some respects 
that an examination by the Board of Examiners is a pre-
requisite to payment of bounty claims. Such a conclusion 
would mean that the Board has a constitutional duty to 
examine clahns. However, the Court also employed language 
which suggested that the Board had merely a power and 
that such power could not be taken from the Board of Ex-
aminers and given to some other agency or officer. The 
reason for this loose and apparently conflicting language 
is simple-the Court was considering and deciding whether 
the Legislature could bypass the Board of Examiners and 
prevent the Board from examining bounty claims, and the 
Court held that the Legislature could not enact such a 
statute. But, that was all that the Court did decide, since 
there was no consideration of the question as to whether 
the Board of Examiners was required as a constitutional 
prerequisite to examine each and every bounty claim. 
The third case which used language suggesting that 
the Board of Examiners might have a duty to examine 
claims related to a salary claim. That case was Board of 
Education v. Cornmission of Finance, 122 Utah 164, 247 
P. 2d 435 (1952), wherein the Board of Education insti-
tuted an original proceeding in the Supreme Court to com-
pel the Commission of Finance to issue warrants on the 
State Treasurer for payment of salary claims of Dr. E. 
Allen Bateman. The issue in the case did not relate in any 
way to the power or duty of the Board of Examiners to 
approve salary claims, since the Board of Examiners had 
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already approved the salary claim in question. However, 
in making a passing comment with reference to the salary 
claim, the Court noted that it had been approved by the 
Board of Examiners, and said parenthetically, that the 
Board "must approve all salary claims against the State" : 
"The Board of Examiners (composed of the 
Governor, Secretary of State and the Attorney Gen-
eral) which must approve all salary claims against 
the State, except those fixed by law, approved by a 
vote of two to one the request of the Board of Edu-
cation to pay Dr. Bateman a salary of $10,000.00 
per annum." (Emphasis added.) 
It again is emphasized that no issue is present with 
respect to whether the Board had a power or a duty to 
examine salary claims, and in fact the Board had approved 
the salary claim in question. Therefore, the particular 
language used by the Court could not be deemed to have 
any particular significance with respect to the particular 
issue of a constitutional power versus a constitutional duty. 
Aside from the three cases just mentioned (which 
vaguely suggest a constitutional duty) , there is a fourth 
case, which is the clearest pronouncement available. That 
case, Thoreson v. State Board of Examiners, 21 Utah 187, 
60 Pac. 982 ( 1900) , involved a claim for refund of lease 
rentals which had been paid pursuant to a void lease. Cer-
tain school lands had been leased by the claimant pursuant 
to a statute which later was declared unconstitutional. The 
Legislature then enacted a statute which provided for re-
fund of all rentals collected under the void leases, and 
specifically directed the Board of Examiners "to receive, 
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audit, and allow all just claims of persons who have paid 
moneys in pursuance of (the void leases)." 
In the original appeal, the Court held that the Board 
could do no more than perform the ministerial act of audit-
ing and allowing all claims which met the legislative cri-
teria for payment. The Board then petitioned for rehear-
ing, and on rehearing the Court discussed the constitutional 
and statutory duty of the Board in examining claims for 
lease refunds: 
The board of examiners are required to perform the 
duties mentioned in said section of the constitution, 
and also to perform such other duties as may be 
prescribed by law. Therefore, the only duties in the 
premises imposed upon the board of examiners are 
such as section 963 of the Revised Statutes pre-
scribes." (Emphasis added.) 
The Court thus clearly stated that, under the constitu-
tional provision and the applicable statute, the only duties 
of the Board were under the statute. Nothing could be 
clearer than the conclusion that there could thus be no 
constitutional duty. But, in fairness, it is admitted that, 
here again, the Court was not considering the power to 
examine versus the duty to examine, and an objective an-
alysis of the cases cannot lend more weight to Thoreson 
than to the other cases. 
The four cases discussed above are the only ones 
using any language of particular significance that even 
discussed whether the Board of Examiners has a constitu-
tional duty to examine claims to be paid from appropriated 
funds. Such language is not only unclear, but it was not 
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even used in response to the particular issue under discus-
sion. Therefore, it could not be said that such language 
could have the effect of establishing a stare decisis prece-
dent for construing the word "power" to mean duty rather 
than power. Therefore, it appears clear that there is no 
judicial precedent to justify construing the clear phrase-
ology of Article VII, Section 13, of the Utah Constitution, 
to mean anything more, less or different from what it says. 
POINT V. 
THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS CANNOT DEL-
EGATE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL DISCRETION. 
It is believed that the lower court's determination with 
respect to delegation of constitutional authority is correct. 
In essence, the lower court held that the Board of Exam-
iners could not delegate any of its constitutional discretion 
but could establish certain criteria for guidelines and per-
mit some subordinate officer or agency to examine certain 
claims to determine whether the criteria were met. If so, 
the Board of Examiners would then accept such determi-
nation and then exercise its discretion in approving the 
claims. If the criteria were not met, then the Board could 
use its discretion in determining the validity of the claim. 
The reason the question of delegation is raised in this 
brief is because this Court has not yet spoken concerning 
the extent to which the Board of Examiners can delegate 
such discretionary authority. Since plaintiff did not ap-
peal, it is deemed advisable to raise this issue in this ap-
peal so that it will be iJ>roper for tl;le Court to comment 
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upon the extent to which such a delegation is proper. This 
issue would become critically important if this Court were 
to hold that the Board of Examiners had a constitutional 
duty to examine every claim of every nature, because the 
Board simply is not equipped to do that type of job with-
out a great deal of assistance. If the Board of Examiners 
were to attempt to delegate any routine matters to the De-
partment of Finance, serious questions would arise as to 
the propriety of such a delegation because the Legislature 
created the Department of Finance to function directly un-
der the office of the Governor and not under the Board 
of Examiners. Therefore, no funds were appropriated for 
the Department of Finance to function as an agent of the 
Board of Examiners. Further, even if it should be con-
sidered proper for the Department of Finance to so func-
tion, it would appear that the Department could not be com-
pelled to accept such an assignment except by specific leg-
islation assigning such a task to it. Of course, no such leg-
islation presently exists. 
If the Board of Examiners is found to have a consti .. 
tutional duty and if the Department of Finance cannot 
function as the agent of the Board of Examiners, then the 
Board of Examiners would have to find funds to employ 
a great many assistants to process all claims prior to their 
payment. Such a result would seem to be an illogical and 
unnecessary duplication of the services now performed by 
the Department of Finance under the direction of the Gov-
ernor. 
As observed above, it is believed that the lower court 
did not commit error in the general decision which it made 
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concerning delegation of constitutional authority, but a 
good many practical problems are created by the lower 
court's further holding that the Board of Examiners had 
a constitutional duty to examine all claims. Therefore, if 
this Court should hold that the Board has a constitutional 
duty, then it should consider and perhaps speak upon the 
nature and extent to which such a duty can be exercised 
by delegation. 
POINT VI. 
IF THIS COURT HOLDS THAT THE BOARD 
OF EXAMINERS MUST APPROVE ALL 
CLAIMS, THEN THE BOARD MAY APPROVE 
ROUTINE CLAIMS BY A MAJORITY THERE-
OF INDIVIDUALLY SIGNING THEIR NAMES 
IN APPROVAL WITHOUT MEETING IN A 
CONVENED SESSION OF THE BOARD. 
Appellants emphasize that this point is important only 
if the Court holds that the Board has a constitutional duty 
to approve all claims (other than salaries and compensa-
tion of officers fixed by law). If the Court holds, as ap-
pellants contend, that the Board has only a constitutional 
power, to be exercised in the discretion of the Board, then 
this point becomes moot, because the Board then can con-
sider only those claims which it wishes to examine, and 
can conduct any such examination in a meeting of the 
Board. 
The lower court held that any constitutional authority 
exercised by the Board of Examiners would have to be 
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exercised in either a regular or special meeting of the 
Board. The practice followed for some time by the Board 
has been for the members to sign their names to a "sum-
mary" sheet which is attached to payroll claims, expense 
reimbursement claims, contract payment claims, etc. This 
perfunctory approval has been performed in the respective 
offices of the members, and there has been no meeting 
where the members have met together for the purpose of 
approving these claims. Of course, many claims which 
the Board thought worthy of its attention have been con-
sidered in meetings of the Board, but the general proced-
ure for approving routine items has been as stipulated by 
counsel in the Statement of Facts. 
This means, then, that, under the lower court's ruling, 
the Board will be compelled to meet in session for the 
purpose of approving all claims. We do not necessarily 
contend that a constitutional function of the Board of Ex-
aminers can be discharged by members of the Board acting 
individually. We submit that all claims which the Board 
desires to examine should be examined by it in either a 
regular or special meeting. 
But, if this Court were to hold that the Board had a 
constitutional duty to examine all claims (as did the lower 
court), then this would require the Board to meet with im-
practical frequency. This Court will take judicial notice 
of all official acts of executive departments of the State 
of Utah (Section 78-25-1 (3), Utah Code Ann.). There-
fore, this Court will judicially notice that the Department 
of Finance issues payroll warrants to State employees on 
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the 5th, lOth, 20th and 25th of each month, and that, in 
addition thereto, there is an average of at least two war-
rant u runs" each week to pay other claims. There is an 
average of from 12 to 15 separate IBM "runs" of warrants 
every month, and the Board of Examiners would thus have 
to meet in session at least this often to examine and ap-
prove these claims prior to issuing the warrants thereon. 
Meeting in this manner not less than three times a week 
is very impractical. 
The practice of the Board of Examiners over the years 
has demonstrated the futility of meeting to examine and 
approve all claims. The Board members have individually 
signed approval to cover sheets or summary sheets so that 
all routine expenditures could be made. This was done, not 
because the Board made any actual examination of the 
claims, but because the Board wasn't sure whether it was 
required to approve such claims or not, and the simplest 
means was individual signatures of approval without meet-
ing in session. Matters which the Board considered of 
sufficient importance for its attention were discussed in 
actual meetings of the Board. 
If the Court holds that the Board has a constitutional 
power to examine claims, then the Board can examine those 
claims which it wishes to examine in the meetings of the 
Board. If this Court holds that the Board must examine 
all claims (even against its wishes) , and further holds that 
the examination must be conducted by the Board in a meet-
ing, then the Board would be required to meet with im-
practical and annoying frequency to discharge a task which 
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would be considered by the Board to be an unnecessary, 
burdensome nuisance. 
CONCLUSION 
Three significant questions of law have been pre-
sented in this appeal, none of which has heretofore been 
determined by this Court. All three of the questions re-
late to the meaning of Article VII, Section 13, of the Utah 
Constitution. The first question is whether the Board of 
Examiners has constitutional authority to fix salary fig-
ures or to arbitrarily prevent payment of salary claims. 
The second question is whether the word "claims" means 
only those demands pursuant to an asserted right, or 
whether it means something broader, including applications 
for employment, uncompetitive bids, and similar matters 
wherein no right or claim of right is present. The third 
question is whether the Board has simply a constitutional 
power to examine claims, or whether it has the more oner-
ous burden of a constitutional duty to examine claims. 
Based upon the arguments presented in this brief, we 
conclude as follows : 
A. Article VII, Section 13, Constitution of Utah, uses 
the clear, meaningful and unambiguous words "power" and 
"claim". Nothing is said about a "duty" to examine claims, 
and nothing is said about "claims" meaning and including 
something more than claims. Nor is there the slightest hint 
that the Board has any authority to fix or set salaries. 
B. The most efficient and practical administration 
of state fiscal matters will be realized by giving the con-
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stitutional provision a literal interpretation and thus sus-
taining the legislation in question. Further, such a result 
will not deny the Board of Examiners full power to examine 
claims, but· in fact will give it greater dignity and discre-
tion. It should be noted that the Legislature considered the 
constitutional power of the Board of Examiners when the 
finance law was passed (by specifically mentioning the 
Board's power to examine claims), and that Senate Bill 
48 had bi-partisan support in that it was sponsored by 
Senator Thorpe Waddingham (Democrat) and Senator 
Hughes Brockbank (Republican). Senate Bill 48 further 
had the approval of the Governor, as attested to by his 
signing the bill into law and further by his position in this 
litigation. Senate Bill 48, as now enacted into law, also has 
the support of the Department of Finance and a majority 
of the Board of Examiners (evidenced by their positions 
in this litigation). 
C. Since the Legislature, the Governor, the Depart-
ment of Finance and a majority of the Board of Examiners 
have demonstrated their support of Senate Bill 48 as 
enacted into law (and which was the product of 22 years 
experience with the previous Commission of Finance) , this 
Court should not construe the clear and unambiguous word 
"power" to mean something completely different, nor 
should it construe the clear and unambiguous word "claims" 
to mean something more than claims, nor should it judi-
cially create authority to fix salaries when no such author-
ity is suggested; particularly when to do so would produce 
an illogical and unworkable end result. 
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D. In other words, this Court should not hold that 
the constitutional phrase "with power to examine all 
claims" means a duty to examine all applications, requests 
and petitions, and the authority to fix salaries, as did the 
lower court. The Board's constitutional power to examine 
claims which are to be paid from appropriated funds was 
intended as a protection to public funds, not as a device to 
require administrative processing, fixing and adjudicating 
of all conceivable requests, applications and petitions. 
Therefore, the judgment of the lower court should be 
reversed, and Sections 63-2-13, 63-2-15 and 63-2-20 should 
be sustained as constitutional, and the salary payment to 
Clair R. Hopkins should be declared lawful. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Attorney General, 
RICHARD L. DEWSNUP, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
ROLAND G. ROBISON, JR., 
Special Assistant 
Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Appellants. 
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APPENDIX 
This Court has on ten separate occasions spoken con-
cerning the constitutional authority of the Board of Ex-
aminers. These cases are discussed chronologically and in 
some detail in the following appendix. The appendix is 
attached as a somewhat objective analysis of the cases per-
taining to the Board of Examiners and its constitutional 
authority. A detailed discussion of all of those cases within 
the body of this brief would have made the brief too long 
and too involved. But, the issues in this case have suffi-
cient importance to justify a careful examination by the 
Court of all previous cases to review the complete body of 
case law relating to the Board as a constitutional entity. 
It is hoped that the appendix will be a convenience to the 
Court. 
The Board of Examiners is created by Article VII, 
Section 13, Constitution of Utah, which provides: 
"Until otherwise provided by law, the Gover-
nor, Secretary of State and Attorney-General shall 
constitute a Board of State Prison Commissioners, 
which Board shall have such supervision of all mat-
ters connected with the State Prison as may be pro-
vided by law. They shall, also, constitute a Board 
of Examiners, with power to examine all claims 
against the State except salaries or compensation 
of officers fixed by law, and perform such other 
duties as may be prescribed by law; and no claim 
against the State, except for salaries and compen-
sation of officers fixed by law, shall be passed 
upon by the Legislature without having been con-
sidered and acted upon by the said Board of Ex-
aminers." 
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An examination of the constitutional power of the 
Board is largely confined to an examination of Article VII, 
Section 13 of the Utah Constitution, as it has been judi-
cially construed. In Thoreson v. State Board of Examin-
ers, 19 Utah 18, 57 Pac. 175 ( 1899), the Utah Supreme 
Court was confronted with the question as to whether the 
Board of Examiners had discretionary authority to reject 
a claim for refund of moneys paid pursuant to a void lease, 
when the Legislature had provided for such refund. The 
claimant had leased from the state certain school lands 
pursuant to an early statute authorizing such leases, and 
had paid lease rentals in accordance therewith. The stat .. 
ute authorizing such leases was later declared unconstitu-
tional and the Legislature thereupon passed an act provid-
ing for repayment of lease rentals collected under the void 
leases. The Board of Examiners rejected a part of Thore-
son's claim on the ground that the money paid did not reach 
the territorial treasury. The statute directed the Board 
"to receive, audit, and allow all just claims of persons who 
have paid moneys in pursuance of (the void leases)." In 
holding that the function of the Board in this instance was 
ministerial and not discretionary, the court said: 
"It is contended by appellant's counsel 'that 
the board cannot audit and allow just claims pre-
sented to it without first sitting in judgment upon 
such claims, and hearing the necessary evidence, 
and making a proper investigation to determine 
whether claims come within this class.' This states 
the matter too broadly. The only investigation 
which the board is authorized to make is whether 
the money claimed was paid in pursuance of the act 
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of 1892. The board had no authority to reject a 
portion of the respondent's claim on the ground 
that none of the money paid, except the amount of 
the claim audited and allowed, ever reached the 
territorial treasury; for no such condition as that 
is contained in section 963 of the Revised Statutes. 
Its terms are plain, explicit, and unambiguous. They 
are susceptible of but one interpretation, and that 
is: The board shall receive, audit, and allow all 
moneys paid in pursuance of the act of 1892. The 
payments under that act were to be made to the 
county courts, and not to the territorial treasurer. 
The facts admitted by the appellant and found by 
the court show that the money claimed was paid by 
the relator's assignor in pursuance of the act of 
1892. The money so paid was, as has already been 
shown, the money which the legislature intended 
should be refunded, and therefore any claim for 
money so paid is a just claim." 
The primary reason the Board refused payment of the dis-
puted part of Thoreson's claim was because Article X, Sec-
tion 7 of the Utah Constitution provided "All public School 
Funds shall be guaranteed by the State against loss or di-
version," and that to pay money as reimbursement for 
school land lease rentals, when such funds never reached 
the territorial treasury, would violate such constitutional 
provision. The court rejected this contention, not deciding 
whether in fact the Constitution would be violated, but 
saying simply that the Board had no authority to decide 
judicial questions and that the court couldn't decide the 
question in a mandamus proceeding: 
"The decision of such a question by the board 
was the exercise of a judicial function. No such 
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judicial power was conferred upon it. Its discre-
tion and duty in the premises were confined to the 
ascertainment of what, if any, amount the relator's 
assignor had paid in pursuance of the act of 1892. 
* * * To allow mere ministerial officers, who 
have no direct personal interest in the matter, to 
refuse to perform an act clearly pointed out, and 
made their official duty, by a statute, on the ground 
that the performance of the act would violate the 
constitution, would be establishing a very danger-
ous precedent, and one not warranted by the author-
ities." 
It is important to note that in the Thoreson case the 
court seemed to focus only upon the statute requiring re-
payment of the lease rentals, and refused to recognize more 
than an auditing function in the Board because the statute 
conferred nothing more than an auditing function. The 
first opinion in Thoreson certainly is not very persuasive 
authority as to the discretionary or quasi-judicial powers 
given to the Board by the Constitution. 
On rehearing in the Thoreson case, 21 Utah 187, 60 
Pac. 982 (1900), it was contended by the Board that the 
statute directing repayment of the lease moneys was un-
constitutional to the extent that it reduced the Board to a 
mere auditor of claims contrary to the constitutional power 
the Board had to examine claims. In affirming its original 
decision, and after quoting the constitutional provision cre-
ating the Board, the court said : 
"The board of examiners are required to per-
form the duties mentioned in said section of the 
constitution, and also to perform such other duties 
as may be prescribed by law. Therefore the only 
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duties in the premises imposed upon the board of 
examiners are such as section 963 of the Revised 
Statutes prescribes. In our former opinion we held 
that the only discretionary power which the board 
of examiners had in the matter was to ascertain 
whether or not respondent's assignor had paid on 
a lease made in pursuance of the void act of the ter-
ritorial legislature the sum claimed by the respon-
dent, and it having been admitted that said sum 
had been so paid, that such payment was, therefore, 
a just claim within the meaning of said section of 
the statute, and that said board of examiners had 
no right to reject said claim on the ground that 
section 963 of the Revised Statutes was violative 
of the constitution, but that it became and was the 
mandatory duty of the said board to receive, audit, 
and allow said claim, and that mandamus lies to en-
force the performance of that ministerial duty. We 
did not hold, as intimidated in appellant's brief, 
that the board of examiners is a mere perfunctory 
body, not capable of exercising any judgment or 
discretion in matters of allowing or rejecting claims 
against the state, but held that in the particulars 
mentioned in this case, where the claim is admitted 
to be just, the board had no discretion, but their 
duties were mandatory. Upon a careful review of 
the case, we are satisfied that our former conclu-
sions are correct." (Emphasis added.) 
Justice Miner, concurring, seemed to suggest that the Board 
of Examiners was to act under the Constitution only "until 
otherwise provided by law," at which time the Board 
would act pursuant to statute only, the provision of the 
Constitution then being fully supplanted by legislation as 
was intended by the Constitution : 
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"By the constitution the board were to examine 
all claims against the state until otherwise provided 
by law, and were also to perform such other duties 
as might be provided by law. Section 963 was a 
provision authorizing and directing the board to 
examine and allow all just claims arising under a 
former statute. * * * Until otherwise provided 
by law, the board were to act under the constitu-
tion. Until otherwise provided by law, no claim 
against the state, except salaries, etc., could be 
passed upon by the legislature, without having been 
considered and acted upon by the board; but the 
board were to perform such other duties as might 
be provided by law, and section 963 was enacted 
in pursuance of the provision in the constitution. 
I am unable to see any good reason why the claim 
should not have been audited and allowed." (Em-
phasis added.) 
As shall be seen later, Justice Miner's reasoning was re-
jected in subsequent cases decided by the court. 
In Marioneau v. Cutler, 32 Utah 475, 91 Pac. 355 
( 1907), the petitioner, a district judge, applied for a writ 
of mandate against the Board of Examiners to compel pay-
ment for mileage as a travel expense. The statute fixing 
compensation of district judges at $4,000.00 per year pro-
vided that no mileage or expenses should be allowed in ad-
dition to the salary. Initially, Article VIII, Section 20 of 
the Utah Constitution fixed the salary of district judges 
at $3,000.00 per year until otherwise provided by law. Sub-
sequent legislation allowed mileage reimbursement in ad-
dition to the $3,000.00 salary. Finally, the act in question 
raised the annual salary to $4,000.00 but expressly disal-
lowed the mileage. 
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The Board rejected the claim for mileage because it 
was contrary to the statute. The plaintiff District Judge 
contended ( 1) that the provision denying mileage expense 
was void because it constituted a double subject matter in 
one statute, thereby violating the single subject require-
ment of the Constitution; (2) that the mileage limitation 
was not the proper subject of a proviso; (3) that the sub-
ject of the act was not clearly expressed in the title be-
cause no reference was made in the title to the elimination 
of the mileage expense; and (4) the earlier statute allow-
ing mileage was still in effect because no express provision 
was enacted to repeal it. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, 
that the Board refused to audit and allow the mileage claim, 
"upon the sole ground that respondents (Board members) 
were advised and believed that there was no law of this 
state authorizing the allowance thereof, and therefore re-
jected the same." 
In rejecting the contentions of the petitioner, and in 
dismissing the petition for writ of mandate, the court ap-
parently sustained the quasi-judicial determination of the 
Board that the claim was not permitted by law. In so do-
ing, the court examined and decided the legal questions to 
determine whether the action of the Board was sound as 
to the principles of law involved. 
Marioneaux may not be entirely consistent with the 
first Thoreson case, supra, wherein the court held the 
Board of Examiners was without authority to decide the 
judicial question as to whether refund of lease rental pay-
ments was an unconstitutional "loss or diversion" of pub-
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lie school funds. In that case the court simply said "the 
decision of such a question by the board was the exercise 
of a judicial function. No such judicial power was con-
ferred upon it." The court then refused to decide the ques-
tion for itself, stating such would be improper in a man-
damus proceeding. 
In State v. Edwards, 33 Utah 243, 93 Pac. 720 ( 1908), 
the court was called upon to decide whether reimbursement 
for travel expense of a court stenographer was "salary or 
compensation of officers fixed by law," and therefore be-
yond the province of the Board to examine. A statute per-
mitted district judges to employ court stenographers and 
to provide for certain travel expenses, not exceeding cer-
tain maximum limitations. The statute further provided 
that upon a certification by the judge as to the amount to 
be paid the State Auditor would draw a warrant for pay .. 
ment of the same. The court held that the employment of, 
and reimbursement of travel expenses for, court stenogra-
phers was compensation fixed by contract between the dis· 
trict judge and the stenographer, and that, even though 
such was authorized by law, it was not compensation fixed 
by law. The court said that the Legislature had no author-
ity to bypass the Board of Examiners by directing the State 
Auditor to make payment directly upon receiving a certifi-
cation by the District Judge: 
"The authority conferred by the state upon cer-
tain officials to enter into contracts with other per-
sons, and to agree upon the compensation to be 
paid for public services contemplated by the con-
tract, not exceeding a specified sum, as we view 
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it, falls far short of fixing such compensation by 
law as contemplated by the Constitution." 
"* * * 
"The attempt by the Legislature to require the 
Auditor to allow a claim which by the Constitution 
must first be approved by the board of examiners 
can avail nothing. The Auditor is bound by the con-
stitutional provision. The Legislature is so bound, 
and so are we. The Legislature may make certain 
evidence conclusive with regard to a specific mat-
ter, but it may not interfere with powers conferred 
or duties imposed by the Constitution. This, in 
effect, is what is attempted to be done in section 
2, c. 72, p. 112, aforesaid. To the extent that the 
provisions of that section are in conflict with the 
constitutional provision governing salaries and com-
pensation of officers fixed by law, the Constitution 
must prevail." (Emphasis added.) 
Thereafter, the stenographer's claim was presented to the 
Board of Examiners, but was denied, inter alia, because 
the Board thought the certification insufficient in that the 
mileage reimbursement was based upon a fixed rate per 
mile, and the Board thought the reimbursement should be 
limited to the amount actually spent by the stenographer. 
In any event, the court issued its mandate requiring the 
Board to audit and pay the claim for mileage, holding that 
the rate per mile was authorized by the Legislature and 
that in such instances the Board had practically no discre-
tionary power other than to ascertain that the legislative 
requirements are met: 
"It is further urged that a writ of mandate 
should not issue against respondents for the reason 
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that in passing upon claims against the state they 
act in a quasi judicial capacity and must therefore 
be permitted to exercise the discretion usually ex-
ercised by such boards. That respondents do act in 
such a capacity, and that they may exercise discre-
tionary powers in the discharge of their official du-
ties in passing upon and in allowing or rejecting 
claims, does not admit of doubt. But this discre-
tion is not one that may be arbitrarily exercised so 
as to prevent a claimant from seeking redress in 
the courts where purely questions of law are in-
volved. In such cases even courts may be compelled 
to proceed to judgment, and, where the law directs 
what the judgment shall be in case all the facts are 
found or admitted, a superior court may direct an 
inferior one with respect to the particular judg-
ment that shall be entered by it. The power to do 
this is not limited to appellate proceedings, as is 
illustrated in the case of State v. Morse, 31 Utah 
· 213, 87 Pac. 705. In this case the essential facts 
entitling the relator to have his claim audited and 
allowed are all admitted. The questions, therefore, 
are purely questions of law. If the claim, there-
fore, is one which is admitted to be just, and is 
authorized by law, and there is no dispute with 
regard to any fact involved, and the claim is pre-
sented to the board in due form as the law requires, 
we know of no law nor reason why respondents, 
although acting in a quasi judicial capacity, should 
not be required to audit and allow the claim. (Em-
phasis added.) 
'* * * 
"In view of the conceded facts, there is nothing 
upon which the respondents can legally exercise any 
discretionary powers in this case, and therefore 
they should have audited and allowed the claim. 
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No doubt they would have done so had they not 
entertained a view of the law different from the 
one we feel constrained to take. In such a case it 
is clear that the law in effect directs what the ac-
tion of the board shall be, and, this being so, there 
is no reason why the board of examiners should 
not be required to comply with what it commands. 
There would be something lacking in our system 
of government or jurisprudence if under such cir-
cumstances a claimant could be defeated simply be-
cause the officer or board required to audit and 
allow his claim exercised some discretion in the mat-
ter. Where the duty to act is clear, and the law 
gives a right to obtain payment of a claim owing 
by the state, courts should not hesitate to enforce 
the right by mandamus. It follows, therefore, that 
the relator is entitled to have his claim for mile-
age as set forth in his petition audited and allowed 
by the respondents as the state board of examin-
ers." State v. Cutler, 34 Utah 99, 95 Pac. 1071 
(1908). (Emphasis added.) 
The two cases involving the stenographer's claim for 
mileage invite an interesting observation. In the first case 
the court held that the Legislature as well as the courts 
were powerless to interfere with the · constitutional right 
of the Board of Examiners to examine claims against the 
State, and that, therefore, the claim for mileage reimburse-
ment could not by-pass the Board irrespective of any con-
trary language in the statute authorizing payments for 
such mileage. In the second case the court held that the 
claim, once presented to the Board, must be audited and 
paid if the statutory requirements are met, and that, 
though the Board is a quasi-judicial body, it exercises no 
judgment or discretion beyond that of a simple audit to 
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ascertain the facts when the Legislature has set the stan-
dard for payment. Apparently then, the Legislature could 
not by-pass the Board by directing that the State Auditor 
pay by warrant upon receipt of a district judge's certifica-
tion of ·miles traveled, but, on the other hand, the Board 
could not add to nor detract from the requirements of the 
statute, and while the Board has a constitutional right to 
examine the claims, it is simply a constitutional right to 
audit (ascertain facts but not exercise discretion) in those 
areas where the Legislature has spelled out the criteria 
for payment. 
To this point (1908), after deciding Thoreson, Marion-
eaux, Edwards and Cutler, the court apparently had rec-
ognized in the Board a discretionary and quasi-judicial 
constitutional power to examine all claims against the 
State except salaries and compensation of officers fixed 
by law, but that, when the Legislature specifically assigns 
to the Board a stautory duty to receive, audit and allow 
claims, the Board cannot exercise its constitutional discre-
tion beyond a mechanical and ministerial examination to 
determine that the facts surrounding the claim comply 
with the legislative criteria for payment. 
The next case to be decided bearing upon the discre-
tionary power of the Board was Uintah State Bank v. 
Ajax, 77 Utah 455, 297 Pac. 434 (1931). The plaintiff 
sought mandamus to compel the State Auditor to draw 
a warrant in payment of bounty claims for killing preda-
tory animals. The Legislature had made an appropriation 
for payment of such bounty claims and had prescribed a 
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procedure for payment. Plaintiff, as assignee of the bounty 
claim for 25 coyotes and 7 bobcats, presented the claim 
in the statutory form and manner to the State Auditor for 
payment, but the Auditor declined to draw his warrant on 
the ground that an examination and approval of the claim 
by the Board of Examiners was a constitutional prerequi-
site. The court was divided, with two of the five justices 
joining in a vigorous dissenting opinion. Perhaps the hold-
ing of the court will be better clarified against the back-
ground of the dissenting opinion. 
Justice Straup, joined by Justice Ephraim Hanson, dis-
sented from the opinion of the court. Justice Straup re-
viewed the specific statutory procedures for obtaining 
bounty payments, and then concluded: 
"It thus is seen that by the act a complete pro-
cedure is provided for the presentation and payment 
of bounty claims and all that is required to be done 
to entitle the claimant to a warrant from the state 
auditor. Such requirements necessarily negative a 
presentation of the claim to the state board of ex-
aminers for its approval. * * * 
"For thirty years claims for killing predatory 
animals have been paid as by the act provided with-
out presenting them to the board of examiners. Not 
until now, to entitle the holder of a certificate to 
a warrant or to authorize the state auditor to issue 
a warrant in payment thereof, was it at any time 
contended that such claims required presentation to 
or approval by the board. * * * 
"That the statute clearly permits and contem-
plates the issuing of warrants in payment of bounty 
claims, without requiring the claims to be presented 
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to and approved by the board, may not well be 
doubted. No serious contention is made to the con-
trary. While in the prevailing opinion it is not ex-
pressly stated that the statute in such particular is 
unconstitutional, yet the holding necessarily is to 
that effect." (Emphasis added.) 
Justice Straup then quoted Article VII, Section 13 of 
the Constitution, relating to the Board of Examiners, and 
argued that the only mandatory duty of the Board was to 
pass upon claims prior to their presentation to the Legis-
lature, and that, unless the Board so acted, the Legislature 
was prohibited from acting: 
"It is thus seen that the inhibition related only 
to the Legislature, forbidding it to pass on any 
claim against the state not considered and acted 
on by the board of examiners. As to the board, the 
Constitution but confers power on it to examine 
all claims against the state, except salaries, etc., and 
to perform such other duties as may be prescribed 
by law." 
Justice Straup next argued that the constitutional power of 
the Board was intended to be only one of examining "un-
liquidated" claims : 
"When properly considered, I think the sec-
tions have no application to the character of claims 
as here involved and which are to be paid not out 
of public revenues or of a general fund, but as ex-
pressly provided are to be paid out of a special fund 
created by the Legislature for a particular purpose, 
and where by the act itself creating the fund, pay-
ment of claims and the manner of presenting and 
paying them are specifically prescribed by the same 
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act creating the fund and where the law itself fixes 
the amount and manner of payment. * * *" 
"This brings us to the constitutional provision. 
Similar provisions by Idaho and Nevada were held 
to embrace or include only claims of an unliquidated 
character (citing Idaho and Nevada cases) . I think 
such is the proper construction of our provision. 
State v. Edwards, 33 Utah 243, 93 P. 720, is re-
f erred to and relied on as supporting a contrary 
doctrine and as an authority that the constitution 
includes all claims, liquidated and unliquidated, ex-
cept compensation and salaries of officers, etc., and 
requires all claims against the state to be presented 
to and approved by the board of examiners before 
the state auditor is authorized to issue a warrant 
in payment of them. In the opinion of that case 
there is undoubted language to that effect. How-
ever, the claim there considered was unliquidated. 
The facts recited in the opinion clearly show that; 
the court in effect so stated. What the court de-
cided with respect to such a claim constituted an 
adjudication and a precedent of binding effect as 
to unliquidated claims. What was said beyond that, 
was mere dicta without binding effect." (Empha-
sis added.) 
The opinion of the court, however, thought State v. Ed-
wards was controlling. Mr. Justice Folland, joined by Jus-
tices Cherry and Elias Hansen, held : 
"This decision (Edwards) we think controlling 
in the present case. It follows, therefrom, from the 
Constitution and statutes as thus construed, that 
the bounty claims or certificates in question must 
be presented to and approved by the board of ex-
aminers unless it appears that they are either not 
'claims against the state' or that they represent 'sal-
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aries or compensation of officers fixed by law.' It 
is not seriously contended that these are not claims 
against the state, but, on the contrary, it is rather 
assumed in the arguments and briefs of counsel 
that they are. This could not well be otherwise. 
That these are demands against the state seems 
clear because the fund from which bounty claims 
are paid is raised by taxation; the money is paid 
into the state treasury, is subject to appropriation 
by the Legislature, and is paid out by the state 
treasurer on warrant of the state auditor. We see 
no good reason why a fund raised by taxation for 
a special purpose is not entitled to the same pro-
tection as is the general fund. That they are 'claims' 
is equally clear." (Emphasis added.) 
In response to the argument that the Constitution only in-
tended the Board to examine "unliquidated" claims, the 
court said: 
"A complete answer to this argument is that 
the Constitution makes no such exception. All claims 
are subject to action by the board of examiners, 
except only claims for 'salaries and compensation 
of officers fixed by law.' The claims here are not 
fixed by law in the sense that the Legislature has 
made an appropriation of an amount certain to a 
definite named person. It is true that a unit price 
to be paid on certain animals as a bounty is fixed 
by law, but before the claim is liquidated it must 
be determined how many animals were killed, 
where and within what county, and the pelts sub-
mitted must be examined and found to comply with 
state statute. While the duty is imposed upon the 
county clerk to make this examination and deliver 
his certificate, it is no answer to the constitutional 
requirement to say that the county clerk has audited 
and examined the claim, and that that is sufficient. 
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There could be no claim against the state for bounty 
until the animals are killed and the pelts presented 
to the county clerk. It is by the county clerk that 
the claim is liquidated, not by the Legislature. May 
the Legislature then, in the face of our constitu-
tional provision, pass over the board of examiners 
and set up some local agency by which claims may 
be fixed and settled without any state officer hav-
ing power to examine and approve or disapprove 
such claim? 
"If we should adopt petitioner's view, it would 
follow that the Legislature might designate any 
officer other than the board of examiners as author-
ized in behalf of the state to settle, fix, or liquidate 
claims and agree upon the amount to be paid there-
on, and thereby ~xclude the board of examiners 
from its duty and responsibility with respect to 
claims thus liquidated pursuant to legislative author-
ity. We cannot agree to any such construction of 
the constitutional language, nor may we by con-
struction interpolate the word 'unliquidated' into 
the Constitution so that it would provide that the 
board of examiners have power to 'examine all un-
liquidated claims against the State,' etc. The Con-
stitution has vested in the Board of Examiners the 
power to examine and pass on all claims except 
those exempted, and the Legislature is without 
authority to delegate such power to any other board 
or officer. 
"* * * 
"If the view is taken that the Legislature in-
tended to make this claim payable by the auditor 
without presentation to the board of examiners, 
then the Legislature attempted to do that which it 
had no power or authority to effectuate * * * " 
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In the above discussion by the Court in the U intah State 
Bank case, it is made clear that the Legislature cannot 
delegate to another officer or body the authority to <(liqui-
date" claims, thus by-passing the Board of Examiners. 
But, the court also refused to construe the constitutional 
provision to mean only "unliquidated" claims. Therefore, 
even if some officer were designated to liquidate claims, 
it seems that such claims still must go to the Board of Ex-
aminers. Perhaps what the court really held was that a 
claim properly liquidated by the Legislature (rather than 
a subordinate public officer) must still be approved by the 
Board, but that the Board has a much narrower range of 
discretion in acting upon such properly liquidated claims. 
Therefore, this range of discretion cannot be diminished 
by a legislative delegation of the authority to liquidate 
claims to another officer or board. To do so would be to 
vest in another officer or agency the real discretionary 
duties of the Board of Examiners, and would reduce the 
Board to a mere auditing agent of the legislatively cre-
ated agency. But, while the court strongly denounced any 
authority in the Legislature to so delegate, it sustained in 
the Legislature itself the authority to "liquidate" claims. 
Further, while the court said that the "Constitution and 
statutes" required the Board to examine claims, it did not 
say whether it was the Constitution or the statutes which 
established the requirement. 
The next case decided by the court and dealing with 
the Board of Examiners was Board of Education v. Com-
mission of Finance, 122 Utah 164, 247 P. 2d 435 (1952), 
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wherein the plaintiff instituted an original proceeding in 
the Supreme Court to compel the Commission of Finance 
to issue warrants on the State Treasurer for payment of 
salary claims of Dr. E. Allen Bateman. There is little dis-
cussion, and no specific holding, concerning the constitu-
tional authority of the Board of Examiners. But, appar-
ently one of the conditions precedent to payment of the 
salary (whether a statutory or constitutional prerequisite) 
was thought by the court to be approval of the Board of 
Examiners: 
"The Board of Examiners (composed of the 
Governor, Secretary of State and the Attorney 
General) which must approve all salary claims 
against the State, except those fixed by law, ap-
proved by a vote of two to one the request of the 
Board of Education to pay Dr. Bateman a salary 
of $10,000.00 per annum." (Emphasis added.) 
Despite the approval of the Board of Examiners, the Com-
mission of Finance refused to pay because it questioned 
the legality of the constituency of the Board of Education 
and the appointment of Dr. Bateman. For reasons imma-
terial to this discussion, the court ordered the salary paid. 
Suffice to say that the Board of Education case simply 
recited that the Board of Examiners must examine and 
approve salary claims, without specifying whether such 
necessity was created under Article VII, Section 13 of the 
Constitution, or under Title 63, Chapter 6 of the Code. 
In March of 1956 the court decided University of Utah 
V. Board of Examiners, et al., 4 U. 2d 408, 295 P. 2d 348 
(1956), wherein the University challenged the authority 
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of the Commission of Finance, the Board of Examiners, 
the Legislature and certain state officers to exercise finan-
cial or other control over the University. The contention 
of the University was that it was an entity created by the 
Constitution and was beyond the control of the State in 
financial and fiscal matters. In a lengthy opinion, written 
by Justice Worthen, the court rejected the position con-
tended for by the University, holding the laws of the Leg-
islature from time to time enacted to control the fiscal and 
financial affairs of the University. The case really seemed 
to be an argument between legislative control of the Uni-
versity versus an autonomous University. Therefore, the 
position of the Board of Examiners as a constitutional en-
tity did not get very clear treatment, and the decision is 
of little help in clarifying the constitutional powers of the 
Board. The case seemed to hold that the University is 
subject to the Board of Examiners because the Legislature 
has so provide<I, but such a holding certainly fails to define 
the constitutional authority of the Board of Examiners. 
A further observation about the University of Utah 
case is that the court, although unanimous in the result, 
was far from unanimous as to the rationale. In fact, no 
other judge concurred in Justice Worthen's opinion as writ-
ten. Justices McDonough and Henriod concurred in the 
result, and Justice Crockett concurred in a separate opin-
ion, which was adopted by Justice Wade in his concurrence 
in the result. Therefore, the statements made in the Uni-
versity case are not only unclear as to the position of the 
Board of Examiners, but they also do not have the approval 
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of any member of the court except the author of the opin-
ion. 
Early in 1958 the Supreme Court decided Bateman v. 
Board of Examiners, 7 U. 2d 221, 322 P. 2d 381 (1958), 
wherein the court sustained the power of the Board of Ex-
aminers and the Commission of Finance, as its administra-
tive arm, to examine into and approve or disapprove pro-
posed expenditures, including salary schedules, of the Sup-
erintendent of Public Instruction and Board of Education. 
After quoting Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution, 
the Court said : 
"The question of importance is the extent of 
the authority conferred by the language, '* * * 
with power to examine all claims against the state.' 
This phraseology has given rise to much concern 
over the reciprocal powers and interrelationships 
of the departments of our state government. In the 
first place, we think that the word 'claim' was used 
in its broadest connotation and we recognize that 
it is susceptible of a variety of meanings; ranging 
from a moral claim; or the seeking of legislative 
largesse; or asserting a privilege; to asserting right 
to compensation for property or materials fur-
nished, or salary for services rendered, to the state. 
But the pivot of the controversy has developed upon 
the term 'to examine.' On the one hand, Education 
espouses the view that the power 'to examine all 
claims against the state, merely denotes an auditing 
function; and on the other, Examiners takes the 
position that it confers plenary power to examine 
into the advisability and necessity of any expendi-
ture or proposed obligation of the state. 
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"The first facet of Education's argument 
against the power claimed by Examiners is that 
the framers of the Constitution envisioned Section 
13, quoted above, as legislative in nature, intended 
to be subsequently modified and controlled by leg-
islative enactments such as the statutes conferring 
powers on Education. They emphasize that such 
was the plain import of its first clause, 'Until other-
wise provided by law, * * *' which they in-
sist modified the entire section. Without going in-
to the detail of the arguments pro and con on this 
facet of the subject it is readily seen that attempt-
ing to give that proviso application to each of the 
subsequent parts of the section gives rise to some 
difficulty grammatically. i.e., it would read: 'Until 
otherwise provided by law, * * * (they shall) 
* * * perform such other duties as may be pre-
scribed by law.' Absent knowledge of the facts con-
cerning its adoption, the most natural meaning 
would be that it applies only to the first sentence 
dealing with the membership of the Board of State 
Prison Commissioners, and by parallel reasoning, to 
the second sentence relating only to the membership 
of the Board of Examiners." (Emphasis added.) 
Here, for the first time, the Court suggested that the com-
position of the Board of Examiners could be changed by the 
Legislature. Does this mean that the Legislature could 
replace all three of the present members (Governor, Secre-
tary of State and Attorney General) and provide for an 
entirely different Board, perhaps with 5, 7 or 15 members? 
Perhaps, or perhaps not. In any event, the court contin-
ued to make it reasonably clear (though only dictum) that 
the composition of the Board could be changed : 
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"The idea that the boards themselves were to 
be subject to change by the Legislature also finds 
support in the practical construction which has been 
placed upon it. The membership of all of the other 
boards provided for in the sections just referred to 
(of the Constitution) has now been changed. A 
conclusion that the initial clause affects the entire 
section would not cast the die in favor of Education 
any more than it would in favor of Examiners, as 
will appear from our discussion of the statute relat-
ing to the powers of the latter board. Yet it does 
have an important bearing on the over-all conclu-
sion we reach in this opinion, which is based to a 
considerable extent upon the concept that the fun-
damental power of government rests in the legisla-
ture." 
In the Bateman case the argument was again presented 
that the Board of Examiners had constitutional authority 
to pass only upon unliquidated claims against the State. 
To this argument, the court responded : 
"Certain it is that one of the functions of Ex-
aminers is to investigate and act as a fact finder 
and advisor to the legislature on claims of that na-
ture, such as tort claims, or other claims for dam-
ages or compensation claimed for property, goods or 
services, by persons who would not otherwise have 
legal redress available. 
"One of the major difficulties with Education's 
contention that, except as to unliquidated claims 
against the state, Examiners has no discretionary 
authority and can perform only an auditing func-
tion, is that that would be but a duplication of the 
duties of the state auditor who is charged with the 
responsibility of auditing the records and accounts 
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of all departments of state government. The ques-
tion as to the extent of the power of Examiners has 
been dealt with by this court in numerous decisions. 
They clearly demonstrate that Examiners has pow-
ers beyond mere auditing." (Emphasis added.) 
The court then went on to note that the Legislature, itself, 
had recognized the constitutional discretionary power of 
the Board of Examiners, as demonstrated by various acts 
of the Legislature : 
"This interpretation of the law is also con-
sonant with the legislative conception of the powers 
of that board. They provide for the presentation 
of all claims against the state to the Board of Ex-
aminers to be passed upon; that it has certain super-
visory powers over the Auditor; and the unanimous 
consent of its members is required before officers 
of the state may make deficit expenditures. It is 
expressly provided that the Department of Finance, 
the legislatively created administrative arm of the 
Board of Examiners, is endowed with authority to 
approve or disapprove of the hiring of all person-
nel, * * *" 
However, the court conceded that, in large part, it was 
controlled by the past history of governmental function and 
by earlier decisions of the court, indicating that, if the 
question were one of first impression, the Board of Exam-
iners might emerge in a different light: 
"Were we interpreting the statutes and consti-
tutional provisions relating to the Board of Exam-
iners for the first time we might be more impressed 
by arguments proposed by Education. However, 
history and experience have always been the very 
bone and sinew of the law. As stated by the great 
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Justice Holmes: 'The Life of the law has not been 
logic; it has been experience.' 
"Looking at the problems here presented in 
broad perspective it is important to realize that our 
legislature has met biennially and in special sessions 
for many years with both the statutory and deci-
sional law of this state being so understood and 
applied that in practical operation the Examiners 
and Finance have exercised general supervisory 
powers over the fiscal and budgetary affairs of 
other departments of state government and no sub-
stantial changes have been made in the law in ref-
erence thereto. 
"On the basis of the constitutional provisions, 
legislative enactments and decisional law of our 
state as it has developed, we are constrained to re-
ject the contention of Education that it is entirely 
free from control of or responsibility to Examiners. 
We do not desire to be understood as saying that 
Examiners can go so far as to in effect exercise a 
veto power over legislation by arbitrarily refusing 
to make funds available which have been appropri-
ated to Education for either general or specific 
purposes. Insofar as this has been done in certain 
instances which had considerable bearing upon pre-
cipitating this litigation, such actions were wrong. 
But inasmuch as the funds in question have re-
verted to the general fund, and the problems are 
now moot, there is no point in particularizing them. 
(Emphasis added.) 
"Notwithstanding the powers conferred upon 
Examiners by the statutes hereinabove discussed, 
which must be recognized, that does not mean that 
it can by arbitrary actions in budgetary matters 
intrude into the internal affairs of management or 
control of the functions of Education within the 
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purview of its purpose as provided by law. The 
latter alone is given the authority and charged with 
the duty of the 'administration of the system of 
public instruction' in the schools of the state. In 
order to discharge that responsibility it is essential, 
and the law contemplates, that it have full control 
of the framing of policy and other aspects of the 
internal management of that department in accord-
ance with such purpose." (Emphasis added.) 
The most recent case decided by the court and touch-
ing upon the powers of the Board of Examiners is Wood 
V. Budge, 13 U. 2d 359, 374 P. 2d 516 (1962), wherein the 
Board had examined and rejected certain unliquidated 
claims, and the Legislature subsequently appropriated to 
the Attorney General money to pay the claims upon secur-
ing appropriate releases. The Attorney General refused 
to pay the claims until a judicial declaration was had to 
determine the propriety of a legislative grant to pay an 
unliquidated claim rejected by the Board. In requiring the 
Attorney General to pay in accordance with the statutory 
appropriation, the court said : 
"We are in accord with the defendant's asser-
tion that the constitutional grant of authority 'to 
examine all claims against the State' gives the 
Board something more than an auditing duty to 
perform; and that within its proper preregative it 
has extensive power and discretion in examining 
into and determining the merits of claims asserted 
against the State. We so observed in the recent 
case of Bateman v. Board of Examiners, after quite 
thoroughly considering the problem and our cases 
which have dealt with it. * * * 
"The provision of Section 13 of Article VII, 
quoted above, that '* * * no claim * * * 
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shall be passed upon by the Legislature without 
having been considered and acted upon by the said 
Board of Examiners' plainly indicates that the ac-
tion of the Board was not intended to be so final 
and absolute as to preclude other action by the Leg-
islature. We can perceive no other meaning than 
that after the Board has performed its duty of ex-
amining and acting upon such claims, the Legisla-
ture may then 'pass upon,' i.e., exercise its judg-
ment, on them and take such action as it deems 
appropriate. Entirely in harmony with this conclu-
sion are: our statutory provision that 'any person 
who is aggrieved by disapproval of such a claim by 
the Board (Examiners) may appeal therefrom to 
the legislature'; the prior decisions of this court 
that have touched upon the matter; and the prac-
tice which has been followed since statehood. To 
d€cide otherwise would produce the illogical result 
of turning the subsequent presentation of claims to 
the Legislature into an empty gesture whose only 
purpose would be to rubber-stamp the action of the 
Board." (Emphasis added.) 
It would s€em that the court's conclusion does not neces-
sarily follow from its argument. Certainly, if the Legisla-
ture only considered those claims recommended for ap-
proval by the Board, the Legislature could still exercise its 
discretion in approving or rejecting the claims previously 
examined and recommended by the Board, and there would 
be no compulsion upon it to appropriate money to pay 
claims recommended for approval by the Board. Further, 
the statutory provision for appeal to the Legislature on 
all claims rejected by the Board can hardly have persuasive 
weight as to the intent of the framers of the Constitution. 
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Nevertheless, the court so held, apparently adopting 
the concept that in areas of doubt or question as to con-
stitutional jurisdiction, the uncertainty should be resolved 
in favor of the Legislature: 
"There is another principle which bears upon 
the question here under consideration. Our Legis-
lature is directly representative of the people of the 
sovereign state, and thus has inherently all of th~ 
powers of government except as otherwise specified 
by the State Constitution. By way of comparison, it 
is significantly different in that respect from the 
federal government, which is a government of lim-
ited powers that can properly do only those things 
within the scope of the powers expressly granted to 
it by the states through the Federal Constitution; 
whereas, the State Legislature, having the residuum 
of governmental power, does not look to the State 
Constitution for the grant of its powers, but that 
Constitution only sets forth the limitations on its 
authority. Therefore, it can do any act or perform 
any function of government not specifically pro-
hibited by the State Constitution. In order to justify 
a conclusion that the power to approve and pay 
such claims has been taken a way from the Legisla-
ture and placed exclusively within the control of 
the Board of Examiners, it would have to clearly 
so appear, which is not the case here." 
Having held that all such claims, whether approved or re-
jected by the Board, could properly pass to the Legislature 
for its disposition of them, the court suggested that the 
decision of the Board should be given careful consideration 
by the Legislature, and that if the Legislature appropriated 
money to pay claims in areas where the state would not be 
liable, even absent its sovereign immunity, perhaps the 
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appropriation would be a gift of public funds, and the 
court would have the final say as to whether the claim 
could be paid : 
"Although the privilege is not ours to pass up-
on the wisdom of legislative action, we think it not 
amiss to point out that due to the extent of its 
powers as to such claims, the Legislature should 
regard its responsibility as correspondingly grave; 
and should bear in mind these facts: That the duty 
of examining into claims against the State was un-
doubtedly given to the Board of Examiners because 
the officers comprising it can be assumed to be ac-
quainted with the fiscal affairs of the State and 
to have a high sense of responsibility therefor; that 
the Board has better facilities at its command for 
investigation and inquiry into such matters than 
has the Legislature, including the fact that the At-
torney General as the State's legal advisor was 
made a member of the Board purposely so that he 
and his staff could be of help in determining 
whether an asserted 'claim' against the State has 
any valid foundation, or whether it is simply a re-
quest for a gift or some other meritless attempt to 
obtain public funds, masquerating under the guise 
of such a 'claim.' 
"For these reasons it is unquestionable that 
this function of the Board of Examiners was in-
tended to be regarded as an important one; and that 
it is the legislative duty to give serious considera-
tion to its recommendations to the end that such 
claims be acted upon with prudence and wisdom 
to best serve the interests of the whole State and 
to avoid making grants in cases where the State 
should assume no responsibility.'' 
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If the framers of the Constitution "purposely" made 
the Attorney General, as the State's legal advisor, a mem-
ber of the Board to provide legal advice as to the claims, 
and if the framers "undoubtedly" named the Governor and 
Secretary of State to the Board because of their familiarity 
with the fiscal affairs of the State, then one cannot help 
but contrast this dictum as to the composition of the Board 
with the dictum of Bateman, which suggests that the Leg-
islature could change the composition of the Board at its 
will, naming a Board with no legal advisors and having 
no person familiar with the fiscal affairs of the state. 
Justice Henriod, concurring in the result and stating 
separately his opinion, seems to concur in the main opin-
ion's reference to the intent of the framers of the Consti-
tution in making the Attorney General a member of the 
Board: 
"It seems obvious to this writer that the Board 
of Examiners was a creature of its constitutional 
parents, who deliberately and with wisdom de-
signed it to include the highest elected legal officer 
of the State. Also obvious, it seems, is that such 
officer was made a member of the Board to deter-
mine if a so-called 'claim' really is one against the 
State, or whether it simply is a request for a gift 
inaccurately called a 'claim,' or some other illegiti-
mate petition for funds. 
"Furthermore, the decision of the Board, after 
it has 'passed upon' a 'claim' should be overridden 
by the Legislature only upon a clear showing that 
its action wholly was arbitrary and capricious. Any 
arbitrary and capricious action of either the Board 
or the Legislature itself in effectuating any action 
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beyond its recognized functions would be subject to 
judicial review in an appropriate proceeding." (Em-
phasis added.) 
Justice Henriod, in his separate opinion, stated that no 
issues were really before the court in the Wood case ex-
cept whether, as a matter of procedure, the claims should 
be paid by the Attorney General. But under the test set 
forth by Justice Henriod, the Legislature could only ap-
propriate money to pay a claim rejected by the Board if 
the Board's action had been arbitrary or capricious. Thus, 
to phrase the matter another way, if the Legislature did 
appropriate money to pay a claim reasonably rejected by 
the Board, then the action of the Legislature would be ar-
bitrary and would be stricken in an appropriate proceed-
ing for judicial review. 
But the opinion of the court seemed to suggest a dif-
ferent test, stating simply that the Legislature should give 
careful consideration to the action of the Board, and imply-
ing that the court might be called upon to invalidate legisla-
tive grants if they amounted to a private gift of public 
funds. 
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